Critical Infrastructure Protection: Maintenance is National Security by Hemme, Kris
Journal of Strategic
Security
Volume 8
Number 5 Volume 8, No. 3, Fall 2015
Supplement: Eleventh Annual IAFIE
Conference
Article 3
Critical Infrastructure Protection:
Maintenance is National Security
Kris Hemme
University of Texas at El Paso
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss
pp. 25-39
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Strategic Security by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more
information, please contact scholarcommons@usf.edu.
Recommended Citation
Hemme, Kris. "Critical Infrastructure Protection: Maintenance is
National Security." Journal of Strategic Security 8, no. 3 Suppl. (2015):
25-39.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Maintenance is
National Security
Abstract
U.S. critical infrastructure protection (CIP) necessitates both the
provision of security from internal and external threats and the repair of
physically damaged critical infrastructure which may disrupt services.
For years, the U.S. infrastructure has been deteriorating, triggering
enough damage and loss of life to give cause for major concern. CIP is
typically only addressed after a major disaster or catastrophe due to the
extreme scrutiny that follows these events. In fact, CIP has been
addressed repeatedly since Presidential Decision Directive Sixty-Three
(PDD Sixty-Three) signed by President Bill Clinton on May Twenty-
Second, 1998.[1] This directive highlighted critical infrastructure as “a
growing potential vulnerability” and recognized that the United States
has to view the U.S. national infrastructure from a security perspective
due to its importance to national and economic security. CIP must be
addressed in a preventive, rather than reactive, manner.[2] As such,
there are sixteen critical infrastructure sectors, each with its own
protection plan and unique natural and man-made threats,
deteriorations, and risks. A disaster or attack on any one of these critical
infrastructures could cause serious damage to national security and
possibly lead to the collapse of the entire infrastructure.
[1] The White House, Presidential Decision Directive/NSC–63
(Washington D.C.: The White House, May 22, 1998): 1–18, available at:
http://www.epa.gov/watersecurity/tools/trainingcd/Guidance/pdd-63.pdf.
[2] Ibid, 1.
This article is available in Journal of Strategic Security:
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol8/iss5/3
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Introduction 
 
U.S. critical infrastructure protection (CIP) necessitates both the provision of security 
from internal and external threats and the repair of physically damaged critical 
infrastructure which may disrupt services. For years, the U.S. infrastructure has been 
deteriorating, triggering enough damage and loss of life to give cause for major concern. 
CIP is typically only addressed after a major disaster or catastrophe due to the extreme 
scrutiny that follows these events. In fact, CIP has been addressed repeatedly since 
Presidential Decision Directive Sixty-Three (PDD Sixty-Three) signed by President Bill 
Clinton on May Twenty-Second, 1998.1 This directive highlighted critical infrastructure 
as “a growing potential vulnerability” and recognized that the United States has to view 
the U.S. national infrastructure from a security perspective due to its importance to 
national and economic security. CIP must be addressed in a preventive, rather than 
reactive, manner.2 As such, there are sixteen critical infrastructure sectors, each with its 
own protection plan and unique natural and man-made threats, deteriorations, and 
risks. A disaster or attack on any one of these critical infrastructures could cause serious 
damage to national security and possibly lead to the collapse of the entire infrastructure. 
 
Since PDD-63 in 1998, policymaker attitudes toward CIP have evolved from being 
largely indifferent to recognizing the multiple man-made and natural threats to CIP, 
resulting in production of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan of 2013 (NIPP 
2013) which is described as, “...streamlined and adaptable to current risk, policy and 
strategic environments… and provides the foundation for an integrated and 
collaborative approach to achieve a vision of: A nation in which physical and cyber 
critical infrastructure remain secure and resilient...”3 This evolution of policy has 
allowed CIP to reach a point at which it is self-sufficient and flexible in addressing 
threats through regular quadrennial evaluations of CIP strategies. However, even though 
it is clear that the United States has the capabilities to address threats through flexible 
policy, research into past and recent disasters involving critical infrastructure indicates 
that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and each Sector Specific Agency (SSA) 
has not heeded previous threats and warnings regarding the potential consequences of 
poor maintenance, opting, instead, for a more aggressive effort towards preventing 
terrorist threats. This likely results from policymakers’ awareness of the political capital 
gained through terrorism prevention that is largely absent from calls for resources to be 
spent on maintenance of infrastructure. 
 
Assessments of the State of U.S. Critical Infrastructure 
 
Assessments of U.S. critical infrastructure have generally indicated that, up until 
                                                          
1 The White House, Presidential Decision Directive/NSC–63 (Washington D.C.: The White House, May 
22, 1998): 1–18, available at: http://www.epa.gov/watersecurity/tools/trainingcd/Guidance/pdd-
63.pdf. 
2 Ibid, 1. 
3 Department of Homeland Security, NIPP 2013: Partnering for Critical Infrastructure Security and 
Resilience, (Washington D.C.: DHS, 2013): 2–56, available at: 
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/NIPP%202013_Partnering%20for%20Critical%2
0Infrastructure%20Security%20and%20Resilience_508_0.pdf. 
Hemme: Critical Infrastructure Protection
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2015
26 
 
February 2013, there was no unified effort to protect the interrelated aspect of critical 
infrastructure due to nonexistent consensus on the interrelationships between sectors. 
This interrelationship between sectors is describes as the interdependencies sectors have 
on one another (i.e. all critical infrastructure sectors rely on the water and energy sectors 
to provide the necessary power and water to remain operational). However, as explained 
in a review of the history of government response to CIP by Thomas D. O’Rourke, the 
U.S. government has attempted to rectify this problem.4 CIP improved its defense 
against and awareness of possible threats posed by man-made disasters after the 1995 
Oklahoma City bombings when President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive 
Thirty-Nine, calling for a government-wide evaluation and re-examination of its ability 
to protect critical infrastructure. As a result, the Attorney General provided an 
assessment of CIP that highlighted the government’s lack of attention to multiple 
vulnerabilities within the physical infrastructure and to gaps in cyber-infrastructure and 
computer network protection.5   
 
Fifteen months after the Attorney General’s assessment, recommendations were made 
by a National Security Advisor-led interagency group, named the President’s 
Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP), which called for cooperation 
between the federal government and its private sector partners.6 This partnership is 
essential because the vast majority (approximately eighty-five percent) of the nation’s 
critical infrastructure is owned and operated by the private sector.7 Ultimately, in 
February 2013, Presidential Policy Directive Twenty-One (PPD Twenty-One) “Critical 
Infrastructure Security and Resilience” was signed. The goal of this directive was to 
strengthen the security and resilience of critical infrastructure and advocate for an 
updated national framework for its protection.8 The Department of Homeland Security 
created the Integrated Task Force in order to implement PPD Twenty-One during a 
nine-month time period starting in March 2013 before returning responsibility back to 
DHS agencies. 
 
The American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) drew similar conclusions and made 
similar recommendations as the PCCIP. Every four years ASCE releases a report card on 
the state of U.S. infrastructure. The latest overall assessment, conducted in 2013, gave an 
overall letter grade of D+.9 ASCE recommended improved cooperation and increased 
investment by the federal government and private critical infrastructure partners. 
                                                          
4 Thomas D. O’Rourke, “Critical Infrastructure, Interdependencies, and Resilience,” The Bridge 37:1 
(Spring 2007): 22–29. 
5 U.S. General Accounting Office, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Federal Efforts Require a More 
Coordinated and Comprehensive Approach for Protecting Information Systems, GAO 02–474 
(Washington D.C.: GAO): 1–84, available at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/240/235055.pdf. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Department of Homeland Security, “Critical Infrastructure Sector Partnerships,” DHS.gov, available at: 
http://www.dhs.gov/critical-infrastructure-sector-partnerships. 
8 The White House, “Presidential Policy Directive – Critical Infrastructure Security Resilience,” 
Presidential Memoranda PPD–21 (Washington D.C.: The White House, February 12, 2013) available at: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/presidential-policy-directive-critical-
infrastructure-security-and-resil. 
9 American Society of Civil Engineer, “Report Card for America's Infrastructure,” ASCE, 2013, available at: 
http://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/a/documents/2013-Report-Card.pdf. 
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According to the ASCE, it is particularly important to combine the resources of private 
owners/operators and those of the government that are dedicated to critical threat 
information, research, and development in order to create an effective defense against 
threats. This partnership, now known as the Private Sector Preparedness Coordinating 
Council (PSPCC), is chaired by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
and includes representatives from the Science and Technology Directorate, Office of 
Infrastructure Protection, and Office of the Private Sector. PSPCC’s mission is to oversee 
the adoption of preparedness standards by the private sector and to promote business 
preparedness. 
 
The 2013 NIPP is the latest iteration in the U.S. federal government’s ever-evolving 
conceptualization of the protection of critical infrastructure. This document is updated 
every four years in an effort to maintain critical infrastructure in the face of changing 
threats and vulnerabilities. The 2013 NIPP meets the requirements set forth by 
Presidential Policy Directive twenty-one and is analyzed as a benchmark for U.S. policy 
efforts to protect critical infrastructure. Mark A. Sauter and James J. Carafano provide 
reviews of the various threats facing U.S. national security, including current and past 
threats facing critical infrastructure, as well as a detailed description of the problems 
each sector is facing in regard to the NIPP.10 The authors report that the U.S. critical 
infrastructure, as a whole, consists of physical assets, information systems, and people, 
while individual sectors include power plants, railroads, hospitals, pipelines and 
government facilities. In addition, each sector is dependent on the other (i.e. dams 
provide water for hydroelectric plants, whereas emergency services requires 
transportation and paved roads).  
 
Sauter and Carafano state that there is a key defining difference between resiliency and 
protection in relation to infrastructure that must be considered when evaluating 
protection policies.11 Resilience places an emphasis on the ability to keep systems 
operating after a catastrophic event, whereas protection refers to security over the entire 
infrastructure system. Sauter and Carafano also highlight the potential consequences of 
cyber-attacks, which can be used for online subterfuge, stealing of information, 
undermining government confidence, interrupting communication, and disruption and 
denial of government service.12 These attacks are capable of disruption and destruction 
of physical infrastructure. The authors conclude that the key to successful infrastructure 
policy involves the balance of costs and benefits, which requires weighing security 
concerns against economic competitiveness. Essentially, the U.S. government has 
acknowledged that there are problems and gaps in critical infrastructure protection 
policies and has attempted to remedy these gaps through constant and regular 
evaluation. 
 
Overview of the Current Research 
 
The purpose of the current research is to examine the current state of U.S. CIP and SSA 
                                                          
10 Sauter, Mark A. and Carafano, James J., Homeland Security: A Complete Guide (New York: McGraw 
Hill, 2012), 403–427). 
11 Ibid, 414. 
12 Ibid, 405. 
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effectiveness in implementing SSP’s. This was accomplished using the following 
methods. First, each SSP was evaluated according to how well it has adhered to the 
basic principles of risk assessment set forth by the 2013 NIPP in fulfillment of PPD 
Twenty-One. It was predicted that the criterion set by NIPP 2013 are sufficient to 
provide guidance enabling SSA’s to create effective protection plans. SSP’s were created 
to support the NIPP by providing goals, priorities, and requirements for CIP; they 
facilitate the coordination of effective allocation of funding to reduce vulnerability, deter 
threats, and minimize the consequences of disasters or attacks. Preliminary predictions 
also suggested that the NIPP policy has improved in its flexibility in addressing multiple 
man-made and natural disasters. Second, qualitative data was gathered regarding major 
critical infrastructure disasters and failures through online searches for credible news 
sources, academic journals, and government reports. This data was used to evaluate how 
each SSA responded to the disaster according to its SSP. 
 
Methods 
 
This research focused on the following areas of critical infrastructure: vital energy, 
transportation and public health sectors, which comprise roughly half of the U.S. critical 
infrastructure. Out of the sixteen sectors encompassing U.S. critical infrastructure, the 
specific sectors examined were the Dams, Energy, Transportation Systems, and Water 
and Wastewater Systems sectors. This research addresses whether or not the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has successfully implemented security to 
protect and maintain the reliance of these sectors. Data were gathered from online 
government sector status reports and by searching for each sector in conjunction with 
terminology indicative of failures, disasters, and attacks. More specifically, data were 
gathered through internet search engines (Google), online academic journal databases 
(JSTOR, LexisNexis Academic), and national news networks, as well as their affiliates 
(CNN, MSNBC, CBS, FOX News). Keywords and terms used for searching databases and 
in search engines included the following: critical infrastructure, critical infrastructure 
protection, homeland security, presidential directive, NIPP, sector specific plan, sector 
specific agency, dams sector, water sector, transportation systems sector, food & 
agriculture sector, energy sector, emergency services sector, success, criticism, threat, 
disaster, breakage, leak, and maintenance. 
 
In order to determine whether or not a report is providing evidence of a “success” or 
“failure,” attention was paid to how effectively SSA’s identified and responded to critical 
infrastructure risk. For example, did SSA’s repair or provide security to critical 
infrastructure prior to a man-made, natural, or maintenance-related disaster? 
 
Searches were limited to the time frame spanning 2003, when the Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive Seven was signed, through 2014. This is the time period during 
which the United States has made vast leaps in policy due to events such as the 
September Eleventh World Trade Center terrorist attacks. Collected data were analyzed 
with regard to whether or not each sector specific agency has effectively utilized its SSP 
to respond to CIP failures or attacks. 
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Criteria that were used to assess whether or not the SSPs have successfully implemented 
security to protect and maintain critical infrastructure are gathered from the National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan 2013: Sector Specific Plans, which states: 
 
SSPs are tailored to address the unique characteristics and risk landscapes 
of each sector while also providing consistency for protective programs, 
public and private protection investments, and resources. SSPs serve to: 
 
1. Define sector security partners, authorities, regulatory 
bases, roles and responsibilities, and 
interdependencies; 
2. Establish or institutionalize already existing 
procedures for sector interaction, information 
sharing, coordination, and partnership; 
3. Establish the goals and objectives, developed 
collaboratively with security partners, required to 
achieve the desired protective posture for the sector; 
4. Identify international considerations; and 
5. Identify the sector-specific approach or methodology 
that Sector-Specific Agencies (SSAs), in coordination 
with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
and other security partners, will use to implement risk 
management framework activities consistent with the 
NIPP13 
 
The NIPP 2013 outlines the methods and criteria the government and private sector 
critical infrastructure partners must work together to handle risks, achieve security and 
resilience. “NIPP 2013 represents an evolution from concepts introduced in the initial 
version of the NIPP release in 2006.”14 This evolution of CIP planning demonstrated a 
streamlined and adaptable approach to risks, policy, and to the strategic environment; 
additionally, the NIPP fosters and integrated and collaborative approach in its concept 
evolutions. In order to determine the effective implementation of roles and 
responsibilities by SSA’s, each SSP must provide evidence through documentation or 
through preparedness efforts that the corresponding SSA has fulfilled all five criteria set 
forth by the NIPP 2013. 
 
Results 
 
Dams Sector 
 
Certain critical infrastructure sectors interrelate with each other in such a way as to 
resemble a domino effect in which one sector’s collapse would affect the other sectors 
associated with its resources. The Dams sector is one such infrastructure; nearly every 
sector relies on water resources provided by dams. For example, the Emergency Services 
                                                          
13 Department of Homeland Security, NIPP 2013, 1. 
14 Ibid. 
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sector relies on water resources for firefighting water supply, emergency water supply, 
and waterborne access in the event of a significant disaster. The Energy sector also relies 
on dams because it provides approximately eight to twelve percent of the nation’s power 
through the hydropower provided by dams. The Food and Agriculture sector utilizes 
water resources provided by dams for irrigation and water management. The 
Transportation Systems sector uses dams and locks to manage navigable water 
throughout inland waterways. The Water and Wastewater sector relies on the dam sector 
assets to provide water to concentrated populations and commercial facilities in the 
U.S.15 
 
In response to the NIPP 2013 requirements, the Dams Sector Specific Plan (DSSP) was 
developed to complement the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) in order to 
“…achieve a safer, more secure, and more resilient Dams sector through lessening 
vulnerabilities, deterring threats and minimizing the consequences of terrorist attacks, 
natural disaster, and other incidents.”16 In order to fulfil Criterion I and II of NIPP 2013, 
DSSP formed the Dams Sector Coordinating Council (SSC), Levee Sub-Sector 
Coordinating Council (LGCC), and the Dams Sector Government Coordinating Council 
(GCC) to address levee protection and resilience issues and cross-sector connections, 
enhance collaboration with state dam safety offices, and implement information-sharing 
operating procedures. DSSP clearly outlined its future goals and objectives within its 
2010 report and has developed a cybersecurity framework which fulfills NIPP 2013 
Criterion III. Criterion IV and V have been fulfilled through the development of 
coordinated multi-jurisdictional exercises involving government and private sector 
assets, and through web-based training modules focusing on crisis management, 
protective measures, and security awareness relevant to the Dams sector.17 
 
Overall, it seems the Dams SSP has fulfilled the requirement demanded by NIPP 2013. 
However, the Dams sector has received a grade of D (Poor) from the ASCE “Report card 
for America’s infrastructure.”18 Furthermore, the ASCE stated in their 2013 report that, 
“the nation’s dams are aging and the number of high-hazard dams is on the rise.”19 This 
threat was evident on December 14, 2005 in St. Louis, Missouri when overtopping water 
at the Ameren UE Taum Suak storage facility overwhelmed the aging dam and caused 
massive failure.20 The number of deficient dams is estimated at more than 4,000, 
including 2,000 deficient high-hazard dams.21 The original purpose of the dams was to 
protect underdeveloped agricultural land, but a major threat stems from the fact that 
                                                          
15 Department of Homeland Security, “Dams Sector: Sector Overview,” DHS.gov, 2013, available at: 
http://www.dhs.gov/dams-sector. 
16 Department of Homeland Security, Dams Sector-Specific Plan: An Annex to the National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan, (Washington, D.C.: DHS, 2010): preface, available at: 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nipp-ssp-dams-2010.pdf. PAGE 2 
17 Ibid. 
18 American Society of Civil Engineers, “Report Card for America's Infrastructure: Dams,” ASCE, 
ASCE.org, March, 2013: 14–16, available at: 
http://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/a/documents/2013-Report-Card.pdf. 
19 Ibid. 
20 E. Witt, “National Weather Service Weather Forecast Office,” NOAA.gov, November 30, 2014, available 
at: http://www.crh.noaa.gov/lsx/?n=12_14_2005. 
21 American Society of Civil Engineers, “Report Card for America's Infrastructure: Dams,” 15.  
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new developments and an increasing population have turned the agricultural land into 
urbanized zones. If these dams and levees were to fail there would be catastrophic floods 
as seen in the wake of both Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita. Unfortunately, only 
sixty-six percent of high-hazard dams have emergency action plans and over 13,000 of 
those dams are located above population centers, creating a huge risk for potential and 
possible catastrophic disasters.22 
 
Consequentially, DSSP primarily places responsibility for protecting populations from 
dam failure on local and state governments, who, in turn, can gain assistance to enhance 
dams through the Dam Safety Act of 2006. The DSSP is a good start but, in order to 
improve upon those preventative measures, the ASCE suggests that the federal 
government reauthorize the National Dam Safety Program, create a national levee safety 
program and a national dam rehabilitation and repair program, and complete the 
national levee inventory. This would cost an estimated $121 billion to repair and 
revitalize the sector.23 Fortunately, new DSSP collaboration is attempting to address 
issues raised by ASCE and successful prevention was seen at the Big Hole River 
Diversion Dam in Butte, Montana. In 2009, the century-old Big Hole River Dam was 
removed and replaced with new concrete intake structures through a project initiated by 
the City of Butte.24 
 
Water Sector 
 
The U.S. critical Water and Wastewater sector includes systems that provide freshwater 
and wastewater collection and management for the nation. There are approximately 
160,000 drinking water systems and approximately 16,000 publicly owned wastewater 
treatment facilities that service the nation at any given time.25 The SSA charged with 
managing and maintaining the U.S. water systems is the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA), which provides personnel for the management and protection of all water 
and wastewater systems. DHS states that the Water and Wastewater sector are  
 
“…vulnerable to a variety of attacks, including contamination with deadly agents, 
physical attacks such as the release of toxic gaseous chemicals and cyber-
attacks…[Resulting] in large numbers of illnesses or casualties and the denial of 
emergency services vital to public health.”26  
 
To fulfil Criterion I of NIPP 2013, the Water Sector Coordinating Council (WSCC) took 
on a more proactive approach in its SSP by forming specialized products that unify the 
                                                          
22 Kristina Costa and Donna Cooper, “The 10 States Most Threatened by High-Hazard, Deficient Dams,” 
Center for American Progress, March 14, 2006, available at: 
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/news/2012/09/20/38679/the-10-states-most-
threatened-by-high-hazard-deficient-dams/. 
23 American Society of Civil Engineers, “Report Card for America's Infrastructure: Dams,” 14-16.  
24 DOWL HKM, “Big Hole River Diversion Dam and Pump Station Replacement,” DOWL.com, 2014, 
available at: http://www.dowl.com/Big-Hole-River-Diversion-Dam-and-Pump-Station-Replacement. 
25 Sauter and Carafano, Homeland Security, 416. 
26 Department of Homeland Security, Water and Wastewater Systems Sector: Sector Overview, 
DHS.gov, June 12, 2013, available at: http://www.dhs.gov/water-and-wastewater-systems-sector. 
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sector with the overall NIPP 2010 security strategy, continuing goals, and milestones. 
The Water Sector created the Nation’s first Critical Infrastructure and Key Resource 
(CIKR) resilience-based security metrics initiative in order to meet Criterion II of the 
NIPP (See Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1.27 
 
The CIKR framework provides a unifying structure for the integration of current and 
future CIP efforts into a single cross-national NIPP risk management framework. In 
fact, most SSP’s have adopted this framework to fulfill Criterion II of NIPP. The Water 
and Wastewater sector adhered to Criterion III by establishing Water Security Initiatives 
in major U.S. cities (Cincinnati, Dallas, New York City, Philadelphia, and San Francisco) 
and using information gathered from the initiatives to publish three temporary guiding 
documents to advise utilities on the design, development, deployment, and use of 
contaminant monitoring and warning systems.28 The Water and Wastewater sector 
responded to NIPP Criterion IV, which requires consideration of international issues by 
promoting, developing, and establishing intrastate mutual aid and assistance 
agreements.  
 
One example of an agreement is the Water and Wastewater Agency Response Network 
comprised of over forty-seven states with a mutual aid agreement to promote a “utilities-
helping-utilities” approach to response and recovery. NIPP Criterion V requires SSP’s to 
coordinate with DHS and its security partners. The Water Sector has complied with this 
criterion by establishing a regional laboratory under the EPA. Although the Water sector 
SSP has managed to fulfill all NIPP criteria, the ASCE’s 2013 Infrastructure Report Card 
gave the Water and Wastewater sector a grade of D (“poor”) due to the century-old water 
pipelines and water mains that result in over 240,000 water main breaks per year.29  
 
One such water main break happened on July 30, 2014 in the midst of a drought in Los 
Angeles, California. A thirty-inch, ninety-three year old pipe burst under Sunset 
Boulevard near the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) campus, trapping five 
                                                          
27 Department of Homeland Security, Water Sector-Specific Plan: An Annex to the National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan (Washington, D.C.:  Department of Homeland Security, 2010), available 
at: http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nipp-ssp-water-2010.pdf. 
28 Ibid. 
29 American Society of Civil Engineers, “Report card for America's infrastructure: Drinking Water D,” 
ASCE,  March, 2013: 17–19, available at: http://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/a/documents/2013-
Report-Card.pdf. 
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individuals and costing millions of dollars in damage to streets and nearby buildings.30 
This is one example of water main damage in a country with more than one million 
miles of water mains, some dating back to the Civil War; the condition of most of these 
water mains is unknown. However, there are some examples of progress, such as in the 
City of Chicago, which has been steadily replacing more than thirty miles of century-old 
water mains per year.31 Proper planning and management has allowed the City of 
Chicago to finance the projects and, possibly, upgrade the systems Laboratory Alliance 
program. 
 
An additional problem with this sector concerns wastewater systems, which require 
maintenance and expansion of pipelines to address sanitary sewer overflows, combined 
sewer overflows, and other pipe-related issues.32 This relates to DHS’s concerns of 
contamination, in which aging treatment plants with inadequate capacity discharge an 
estimated 900 billion gallons of untreated sewage each year into freshwater sources that 
are used to provide water to the nation. The Water and Wastewater sector, like the Dams 
sector, is highly interrelated with other sectors, meaning that damage to this sector can 
have consequences for other areas of critical infrastructure. 
 
It is possible to achieve water infrastructure security through the four steps suggested by 
ASCE: 1) raise awareness regarding the true cost of supplying clean, reliable drinking 
water and encourage strategies for water conservation; 2) revive the State Revolving 
Loan Fund under the Safe Drinking Water Act and Clean Water Act, which would 
reauthorize federal funding to a minimum of twenty billion dollars over five years giving 
the Water sector the necessary funding for maintenance and security; 3) eliminate the 
cap on private bonds for water infrastructure projects in order to increase private 
financing and support; and 4) establish water investment programs and a federal water 
infrastructure trust fund to provide financial support for the burden of repair.33 All steps 
are currently being addressed by the Water and Wastewater SSP and are outlined in 
Goals one to four.34 The complete repair and investment costs for improving the Water 
and Wastewater sector is approximately $633 billion and rising, which means that the 
threats to this sector are growing slowly despite DHS efforts. 
 
Transportation System Sector 
 
The transportation system efficiently and securely transports goods and people through 
the country and overseas. It consists of seven subsectors: Aviation, Highway 
Infrastructure, Maritime Transportation System, Mass Transit and Passenger Rail, 
Pipeline Systems, Freight Rail, Postal and Shipping.35 
                                                          
30 Matt Hamilton, “Broken Water Main Floods UCLA; 5 People Rescued,” Associated Press, July 30, 2014, 
available at: http://bigstory.ap.org/article/broken-water-main-floods-ucla-drivers-rescued. 
31 Dan Mihalopoulos, “City Inaugurates Costly Plan to Replace Aged Water Mains,” The New York Times, 
December 17, 2011, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/18/us/chicago-inaugurates-costly-plan-
to-replace-aged-water-mains.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1. 
32 American Society of Civil Engineers, “Report Card for America's Infrastructure: Wastewater D,” 29-32.  
33 American Society of Civil Engineers, “Report card for America's infrastructure: Drinking Water D,” 18.  
34 Department of Homeland Security, Water Sector-Specific Plan. 
35 Department of Homeland Security, “Transportation Systems Sector: Sector Overview,” DHS.gov, March 
25, 2013, available at: http://www.dhs.gov/transportation-systems-sector. 
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These subsectors are vital to the transportation sector, as well as to other vital critical 
infrastructure sectors. The Transportation System sector is immense, consisting of 450 
commercial airports, four million miles of roadways, 10,000 miles of navigable 
waterways, mass transit systems, 143,000 miles of train track and more. It is managed 
by three cooperating agencies responsible for travel and entry to the U.S. by land, sea, 
and air; these SSA’s are the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the U.S. 
Coast Guard (USCG), and the Department of Transportation.36 This research evaluates 
the Highway Infrastructure sub-sector (bridges, roads, and transit). Criterion I is 
addressed by the SSA’s in charge of the Transportation Systems sector through the 
inclusion in the SSP of a Managing and Coordinating model, which outlines the three 
SSA’s and their roles, individual duties, and cooperative duties.37  
 
Criterion II and IV are fulfilled through the Transportation security SSP’s adoption of 
the CIKR risk management model developed by the water sector. In addition to 
providing a unifying structure, CIKR has allowed Transportation System SSA’s to 
formulate a cooperative risk management framework internally and across national 
NIPP sectors. The Transportation System SSP lists all objectives and goals for 
immediate and long-term plans within its 2010 report, as well as details on how the 
SSA’s will carry out their goals.38 For Criterion IV, all three SSA’s (USCG, TSA, and 
DOT) have identified international considerations when dealing with immigration, 
imports, exports, and travel between states and countries. 
 
The potential risks and threats to the transportation sector are varied in spectrum from 
problems caused by infrastructure disrepair to terrorist attacks, such as the 9/11 World 
Trade Center attack in New York. As with the Dams and Water sectors, many critical 
infrastructure sectors are interrelated with the transportation sector and its function to 
move people and goods in mass quickly and securely. The ASCE’s 2013 Infrastructure 
Report Card gives the transportation sector a C+ (“mediocre”) for bridges, a D (“poor”) 
for roads, and a D (“poor”) for transit systems.39 
 
Forty-two percent of the nation’s major urban highways are congested daily which costs 
$101 billion in lost time and fuel annually, while nearly eleven percent of the nation’s 
bridges are considered structurally deficient.40 From 2012 to present, Los Angeles has 
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been judged to be the U.S. city highest in traffic gridlock. Vehicles in L.A. spend a 
cumulative 6.6 million extra hours on the road due to heavy traffic, costing millions to 
the state economy.41 These examples indicate how much time can be lost on congested 
highways across the nation, potentially hampering multiple critical infrastructures from 
fulfilling their operational goals. For example, if there is constant gridlock in a city, it 
would obstruct emergency response personnel and medical personnel comprising the 
Emergency Services sector.  
 
Nationwide, from the 1950’s to 1970’s, most bridges were constructed through the 
Interstate Highway System and were built with cheap and easy-to-build material.42 
Interstate Highway System bridges were meant to be erected quickly and were designed 
to last approximately fifty to sixty years; however, most bridges are passing their fifty 
year expiration date, resulting in the potential for collapse. For example, the Mount 
Vernon, Washington I-5 bridge collapsed into the Washington River after a semi-truck 
collided into it.43 In response to these threats, the Oregon Legislature passed the Oregon 
Transportation Investment Act in 2003 which increased priority of the state’s bridge 
program.  Although it cost $1.3 billion, it saved the state an estimated $123 billion in 
potential lost production that would result from collapsed bridges. ASCE concluded that 
the only long-term remedy to the deterioration of the bridges subsector is to develop a 
national strategic plan that addresses structurally deficient and functionally obsolete 
bridges, followed by research into making bridges more structurally resilient.44 
 
In the Transit subsector, over fifty-five percent of U.S. households have access to the 
transit system (e.g. metro rail systems, taxis, city buses) and, of that the percentage that 
have access, there was an increase in metro usage by nine percent in the past decade, 
despite the fact that these systems are deficient and deteriorating. This means that, over 
time, more and more people will rely on transportation systems with maintenance 
backlogs.45 Transportation maintenance backlog stems from irregular monitoring of the 
condition of transit fleets by Transportation system SSA’s. Many transit sector agencies 
do not conduct regular, comprehensive asset condition assessments, placing the transit 
sector behind its respective transportation sector counterparts. Slow economic growth 
has caused many local and state government to cut funding for the obsolete and aging 
transit fleets, resulting in an increased cost to passengers.46 $112 billion is needed in 
order to fully repair and install improvements to these transit systems. Despite serious 
cuts in funding and in service, many transit agencies have still managed to be leaders in 
making use of technological advances, such as offering real-time arrival information and 
online route planning, in order to make their systems convenient, reliable, and secure. 
This is consistent with ASCE’s recommendations of having the U.S. government 
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adequately fund maintenance of transit vehicles and facilities to maintain a state of 
“good repair” and to reduce system life-cycle costs. 
 
The ASCE has recommended steps for improving the transportation sector.47 First, 
public access to transit should be increased in urban, suburban, and rural communities. 
Second, the federal government must identify a reliable source of revenue, besides 
relying on the fuel tax, to fund highway repairs and improvements. These steps could 
possibly jump start investment in the transportation sector and slowly close the 
investment gap. All steps have been addressed in goal three and goal four of the 
Transportation SSP by “…effectively using resources by minimizing duplicate efforts, 
improving coordination, and aligning resources to address high sector risks.” DHS has 
anticipated the risks and threats to the transportation sector and can potentially fulfill 
the investment gap over the long run. 
 
Energy Sector 
 
The Energy sector has been declared “uniquely critical” by Presidential Policy Directive 
Twenty-One because it provides an enabling function across the fifteen other critical 
infrastructure sectors.48 Over eighty percent of the energy infrastructure is owned by the 
private sector and is responsible for supplying the nation with fuel for the transportation 
sector and electricity for homes and businesses. This sector is divided into three 
subsectors (electricity, oil, and natural gas) and includes production platforms, 
processing, refining facilities, terminals, nuclear, coal power plants, transmission, 
distribution, and control and communications systems.49 NIPP Criterion I is addressed 
by the Energy SSA through its efforts to federally authorize the North American Electric 
Reliability Corporation to develop additional reliability standards for the power grid.50 
Both the electricity subsector and the oil and natural gas subsectors have begun an 
enhanced approach to planning for cyber security threats to infrastructure, in fulfillment 
of Criterion II of NIPP. The energy sector worked closely with the chemical sector to 
implement new goals and objectives with security partners regarding safety and security 
at chemical facilities. This demonstrated an effort by the energy sector to achieve 
Criterion III through collaborating to strengthen security between the energy and 
chemical sectors, which share energy-related facilities and infrastructure.51 The energy 
sector has accomplished Criterion IV by constantly being kept abreast of the 
interdependencies of infrastructure that crosses international borders. Oil and natural 
gas pipelines and electric transmission lines have helped the energy sector and its SSP 
integrate the U.S. with the rest of the North American continent.52 In 2010, the energy 
sector employed the CIKR risk management model, which fulfils Criterion V by 
implementing a framework capable of crossing SSA’s and better coordinating with 
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DHS.53 
 
There are multiple potential risks and threats to the energy sector that have not been 
addressed and are currently causing major problems for some portions of the U.S. The 
U.S. relies on aging electrical grids and pipelines. Limited maintenance of these grids 
and pipelines has caused power fluctuations and interruptions, and privately owned 
Energy sector infrastructure and business energy infrastructure configurations have 
posed challenges to implementing security initiatives. This is mainly due to private and 
business Energy infrastructure owners often leaving its critical infrastructure with 
minimal security, which can make it a target for potential attacks.54 Aging power lines 
have resulted in an increase in the number of outages from seventy-six in 2007 to over 
307 in 2011, placing not only the Energy sector at risk, but also all fifteen other critical 
infrastructure agencies that are dependent on the energy it provides.55 However, as an 
example of improvement, in 2012 the San Diego Gas & Electric Company addressed the 
San Diego region blackout and brownout problems by completing a 500,000 volt 
transmission line, called the Sunrise Powerlink, linking San Diego to the Imperial 
Valley.56 This gave the San Diego region a link to one of the most renewable energy-rich 
regions in the state of California. Yet, despite instances of success, the oil and gas 
subsectors, primarily owned by the private sector since 2008, have experienced a series 
of oil and gas pipeline failures. One example of failure took place in March 2014 in New 
York City in which a 127 year-old gas main exploded, killing eight, injuring dozens, and 
collapsing a five-story building.57 
 
In response to the potential risks and to disastrous incidents, the energy sector specific 
plan (ESSP) was developed by DHS and introduces “…several new topics in preparing 
for all hazards and natural disaster. Protecting and improving the resilience of the 
Energy Sector in the face of manmade and natural disaster is an ongoing effort that 
requires continued vigilance, contingency planning, and training.”58 
 
In order to fully improve and secure the Energy sector, the ASCE suggests the federal 
government take a number of incremental steps: 1) identify and prioritize risks to energy 
security and develop standards and guidelines for managing maintenance programs, 2) 
create incentives to promote energy conservation and the installation and development 
of efficient renewable energy generation, and 3) adopt a national energy policy that 
anticipates and adapts to possible energy needs, all while increasing the efficiency of 
energy use and decreasing dependence on fossil fuels.59 These steps have been noted and 
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addressed by Energy SSP goals one through six and through the energy SSA’s efforts to 
bridge public security policy with private sectors managing the energy sector.60 
 
Conclusion 
 
This research has demonstrated that the U.S. has many challenges that must be 
addressed by the government-mandated NIPP and its SSP’s. Despite the mission and 
goals provided by the NIPP, it is impossible to protect critical infrastructure from all 
possible risks and threats. Critical infrastructure must become resilient in the face of a 
catastrophic disaster or attack. SSA’s must be able to not only protect infrastructure 
from attack or disaster, but also keep sectors in service through the development of 
plans that prepare sectors to handle most threats. This type of resilience calls for SSA’s 
to structure SSP’s to be able to absorb, adapt, and recover from catastrophic events and 
helps determine whether or not DHS has been successful in providing CIP. 
 
This research was unable to evaluate all aspects of U.S. critical infrastructure. Due to 
the immense size and scope of the entire U.S. critical infrastructure system a full team of 
data collectors and researchers would be needed. Fortunately, to meet this end, in March 
2013, DHS established a nine-month Integrated Task Force (ITF) comprised of eight 
working groups, each focused on specific policy implementations, to evaluate and guide 
SSA’s in implementing NIPP 2010 and PPD Twenty-One. Additionally, further research 
is needed to evaluate critical infrastructure cyber security. Cyber security is the new 
frontier in risk assessment and its full implementation as directed by Twenty-One needs 
to be further researched. 
 
Qualitative data gathered from news documentation and reports from the ASCE have 
indicated that there is a serious lack of maintenance and funding needed to update and 
repair the nation’s critical infrastructure—approximately $3.6 trillion by the year 2020. 
All SSP’s evaluated by this report have been found to be compliant with all criteria set 
forth by the 2013 NIPP and have demonstrated excellent ability to reduce risks from 
man-made disasters. The National Security Strategy of 2010, a document describing the 
strategy to protect the U.S. from foreign and domestic threats, lists CIP as part of the 
main strategy by stating, “…When incidents occur, we must show reliance by 
maintaining critical operations and functions, returning to our normal life, and learning 
from disaster so that their lessons can be translated into pragmatic changes when 
necessary.”61 More recently, the National Security Strategy of 2015 calls for a more 
integrated approach by stating, “We are working with the owners and operators of our 
nation’s critical cyber and physical infrastructure across every sector – financial, energy, 
transportation, health, information technology, and more – to decrease vulnerabilities 
and increase resilience.”62 These two statements demonstrate how CIP fits within the 
overall structure of the homeland security enterprise and that SSA’s have been shown to 
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be compliant in providing recovery and solutions to disasters. However, the larger 
threat stems not from occasional natural or man-made disasters, but from a lack of 
maintenance, which now costs an estimated $3.6 trillion to remedy.  If critical 
infrastructure maintenance is not effectively addressed, there may be severe negative 
consequences for national security. 
Hemme: Critical Infrastructure Protection
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2015
